Seesame x GLOBSEC Policy Institute

Reporty pre ľudí, ktorí nečítajú reporty





AKO náš † dizajn a dátové vizualizácie V dávajú Vážnym zisteniam stráviteľnú v podobu

Prečo sú reporty dôležité

Reporty Globsecu pomenúvajú zásadné fenomény nášho sveta. Pozerajú sa naprieč krajinami na to, ako vnímame geopolitiku, nakoľko prepadáme dezinformáciám, alebo akým výzvam čelia demokracie v strednej a východnej Európe. Ich zistenia sú pre pochopenie tohto zložitého sveta kľúčové, no často je náročné podať ich zrozumiteľným spôsobom.

Globsec si uvedomil, že forma je rovnako dôležitá ako obsah. Preto nás už pred rokmi oslovil so zaujímavým zadaním.

G F C



Pripravte report pre ľudí, © ktorí nečítajú!? reporty.



GLOBSEC

20

GLOBSEC Outh rends

Central Europeans:

GLOBSEC Trends 2019

GCOBSEC

Central & Eastern Europe 30 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain



Young Central Europeans: strongly European



G GLOBSEC

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe

<020

strongly European

Young Central Europeans:

democracy & governa in 10 EU countries

GLOBSEC Megatren 2020

G GLOBSEC

pr

Trends Triggered & Accelerated by COVID-19 The World After



Voices of Central and Eastern Europe

GLOBSEC









GLOBSEC Trends

GLOBSEC



Pomocou sofistikovaných dátových vizualizácií, ilustrácií a premysleného dizajnu ukazujeme svet tak, aby mu rozumel każdy.

Pôvodný dizajn



Despite the wealth of available statistical data and existing research, no attempt was made, until now, to summarise these findings in a concise comparative analysis mapping the vulnerabilities of the V4 countries to such subversive foreign influences. In order to provide decision and opinion makers

Subversive Russian Influence in Central Europe

As a result, a fact-based Vulnerability Index of Central European countries was developed to understand the on-going dynamics in Central Europe and attitudes towards the United States, Russia, the European Union and NATO, and to provide a comparative overview of what measures need to be implemented (and in which country) in order to make us more secure. The Vulnerability Index measures vulnerability of a given country on a scale of 0 to 100, where the higher score represents the higher vulnerability to subversive foreign influence.

with an overview of such vulnerabilities, the GLOBSEC Policy Institute developed a methodology

based on measurable set of societal and political indicators, analyses of opinion poll data, political landscape, structure of the media and the state of civil society. By pooling together data and insights

from the Central European experts, we were able to rank the region's vulnerabilities

Our Vulnerability Index shows, that Hungary is the most vulnerable country in the Visegrad group to hostile foreign influence with an overall score of **57 out of 100**. This outcome confirms the growing rift between Hungary and Western Europe on many fundamental issues, which is largely a result of Hungary`s sliding into illiberalism and the attraction of Hungarian political elites towards the Russian geopolitical orbit. However, this is in contrast with public opinion in Hungary, which, according to polls, clearly prefers a pro-western geopolitical orientation and shows a relatively stable support for NATO, the EU and the U.S.

Slovakia ranked as the second most vulnerable country, with an overall score of 51 out of 100. Transactional and opportunistic attitudes towards the EU and NATO, widely shared by the political elites and the public, persistent energy ties to Russia and political elites' naïve perceptions of the Kremlin's geopolitical goals in Central Europe put Slovakia in a very vulnerable position. A small push could change the course of the country in either direction.

The Czech Republic ranked the third among the Visegrad group with an overall vulnerability index of **38 out of 100.** Czech society, despite being quite euro-sceptic, simultaneously rejects a pro-Russian orientation. One notable exception is Czech President Miloš Zeman, who is regarded by many as the most important and visible pro-Russian political actor in the region. At the same time, the current Czech government is leading the way in addressing subversive foreign efforts by setting up a dedicated anti-hybrid threats task force at the Ministry of Interior and is in close cooperation with a very active civil society.

According to Vulnerability Index, Poland is the least vulnerable country in the region to subversive foreign influence with a score of 30 out of 100. Due to the hard lessons learned by Poland in its turbulent history and the contemporary geopolitical situation, Polish society is the most stable ally of the West in the Visegrad Group. Yet, despite having one of the most pro-European populations in Europe, last year Polish voters elected a conservative Eurosceptic government, which shares some common tendencies with the Hungarian regime. Despite its alignment with the EU, Poland rejects any criticism of its governance by Brussels. It holds the United States as its primary and strategic ally.

The Visegrad group countries in are often perceived as a region. They share common history, con embed themselves in the western

there are internal forces in each of the Visegrad group countries trying to subvert and undo this journey and change the cultural and geopolitical orientation of each country.

Such efforts are aided and strengthened also by foreign actors who use every opportunity to sow discontent, create divisions and provide alternative narrative for the whole region. Russia as the main regional actor operating outside of the EU-NATO framework is projecting its power in Central Europe region by means of diplomatic activities, energy and economic policy, information warfare and support to domestic political forces (both mainstream and fringe) sympathetic to the Russian narrative, with the overall aim of restoring its influence in the region and weakening the EU and NATO. Following the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections, the issue of Russian influence in the has become more important than ever.

le are the Visegrad four societies to such subversive foreign influence?

weak spots to be remedied and what are the examples of best practices in addressing

2017 Globsec Vulnerability Index

(A) GLOBS

September 2016

GLOBSEC Trends

Central Europe under the fire of propagand

Public opinion poll analysis Czech Republic, Hungary a

GLOBSEC

membership.

On the other side of the spectrum towards membership in the EU is is lower than the approval rating of

membership is neither good nor ba

in the context of the migration crisis

weeks after the alarmist messaging

A bit more optimistic results come fr

is a good thing, 32% hold the "r

and more than 40% see it as neither if a referendum – which is already

III. Importance of NATO

"Do you agree or

NATO membership is good for our country security.

Our country should help defend an attacked ally.

Our country should allow NATO infrastructure on its soil.

USA control countries like our country through their NATO membership.

USA and NATO are responsible for the

USA and NATO are responsible for the Ukraine crisis.

The neutrality would provide our

-100

Globsec

LUIU Trends


Besides overall support for integration groupings, the poll monitored the specific perceptions and motivations of the respondents. For instance, 78% of the Hungarians, 69% of the Czechs, and 54% of the Slovaks agree that membership in NATO is important for their country's security. Although there are significant differences across the region – with **Hungary being the most and Slovakia the least pro-Atlantic** – **the majority in each of these countries understand the value of NATO**. Also, 78% of the Hungarians, 68% of the Czechs and 54% of the Slovaks think that their country should participate in the defence of an ally, if attacked. The opinion poll conducted in the Czech Republic included an additional question inquiring about a specific scenario of Russia attacking a Baltic state: The willingness to engage in a collective defence was just 47%.

On the other hand, there is **considerable resistance towards NATO infrastructure**, with 56% of the Czechs and 55% of the Slovaks opposing any allied build-up on their soil. Again, the Hungarians seem to be more favourable towards NATO, with only 34% opposing the NATO infrastructure while 48% support it.

A particularly disturbing finding comes with the question whether neutrality would provide better security than NATO membership, which is one of the key narratives aimed at undermining popular support towards NATO membership: Although only 20% of Slovaks and 17% of Czechs oppose NATO membership, as soon as the word neutrality appears, 39% of Czechs and 47% of Slovaks respond that neutrality would be better than NATO membership. In the case of Hungary, the number is lower, at 30%.

IV. The role of the United States in the world

"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"



Note: The total of 100% in each country represent answers "do not know"

Czech Republic / Hungary / Slovakia

Czech Republic / Hungary / Slovakia

Náš redizajn





Vulnerability Index 2021




Vulnerability Index 2021

www.vulnerabilityindex.org

Analyzing the vulnerabilities of eight Central European and Western Balkan countries towards foreign malign influence

NOVEMBER 2021











Macedon GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021 Romania Slovakia

Builgialita

Molelly

w.vulnerabilityindex.org





Serbia

GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021 **O *North** Macedonia Romania



www.vulnerabilityindex.org

GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021 Montenegro

Macedonia Romania



GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021 Slovakia

www.vulnerabilityindex.org

NOVEMBER 2021



GLOBSEC

myHive Vajnorská 100/B, 831 04 Bratislava Slovak Republic +421 2 321 378 00 info@globsec.org www.globsec.org






GL Vu In

H

No

www.vuln

Political landscape



The extent to which any country could be susceptible to foreign malign influence is broadly influenced by the quality of political representation. This includes the polity's commitment to the rule of law and its willingness to pursue cooperation with or membership in important democratic multilateral organizations that safeguard peace and security.

Central Europe and the Western Balkans regions boast a diverse political landscape, reflecting historical, geographic and cultural differences. These patterns are mirrored in widely contrasting levels of Beijing's and the Kremlin's ability to steer political developments on the ground according to their interests. Despite these differences, however, the political covered countries. This variance

included in the Vulnerability Index are surprisingly homogenous in their stable commitment to the EU and NATO, which to some extent limits the scope for interference by malign actors.

The political landscape and its vulnerability to foreign influence, nonetheless, varies relatively widely across the eight representatives of the countries can be summed up into three

Countries displaying greater resilience to foreign influence in the political arena typically display a combination of an enthusiastic orientation towards the EU and NATO and a muted pro-Kremlin and/ or pro-Beijing orientation.

tiers: countries where political landscape has proven to be somewhat resilient towards malign Beijing and the Kremlin have foreign influence (Romania, North Macedonia, Slovakia and Czechia); their interests through close places where a moderate level of cooperation agreements or vulnerability is present (Bulgaria and Montenegro); and countries whose political entities and figures significant sway in Bulgaria. contribute significantly to the country's vulnerability (Serbia and Macedonia and Serbia, while Hungary).

Countries displaying greater resilience to foreign influence in the political arena typically generally display a combination of an enthusiastic orientation towards the EU and NATO and a muted pro-Kremlin and/or pro-Beijing orientation. In other cases, pro-Kremlin and pro-Beijing actions and rhetoric of some political figures, typically

facilitated by the witting or unwitting promotion of their interests, is counterbalanced by strong commitments to Euro-Atlanticism. Over the monitoring period from 2016 to June 2021, political representatives in six of eight countries studied generally pursued policies supportive of the EU. NATO, for its part, commands even greater backing, with 7 of 8 countries pursuing constructive long-term cooperation with the Alliance.

Countries in the bottom tier, by contrast, have seen their leaders exhibit strong anti-EU or anti-NATO rhetoric and actions and seek out and implement close ties with the Kremlin and Beijing - political elites in Serbia, for example, have been prodded in this direction due, in part, to the country's absence from Euro-Atlantic structures. This focus, in turn, renders any meaningful foreign policy shift unlikely in the near future.

In terms of the extent to which been successful in promoting political PR in the analyzed countries, the Kremlin still holds Hungary, Montenegro, North promotion of Beijing's interests by influential political actors is somewhat less prevalent but plays an important role in Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

© Focus on Slovakia



Slovakia measures up as one of the three most resilient countries examined in the report.

Civil society, notably, has been instrumental in the country's significant turning points (the fall of Vladimir Mečiar's rule in the 1990s and the change in government following the murder of Ján Kuciak in 2018). The civic and academic space underscores an area of relatively robust resilience. Limited polarization, an academic community free of external influence, and active and sustainable civil society

organizations contribute to a rather vibrant civic space.

The country's strident protransatlantic orientation has been strengthened by the backing of a majority of important political players over the past decade including multiple presidents and foreign ministers. Pro-Kremlin figures, however, continue to make political appearances and seek to exploit the country's key vulnerability - citizen attitudes.

Pro-Russian attitudes and a general lack of awareness regarding Beijing's influence constitute key points of societal vulnerability in the country. These counter currents are combined

with a strong inclination to believe disinformation and conspiracy theories. Further paired with a vast ecosystem of outlets that promulgate problematic content, these factors constitute a major vulnerability for the future.




: Slovakia, ecoming West olstered

> Russia ictor ing on cerns

> > ture tions

Focus on Slovakia 29



Political landscape





The political landscape in Slovakia can be characterized as a fractured space divided on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues. The 2020 parliamentary elections were contested by 25 political parties, with the current parliament entailing recent years. a mix of strident backers of liberal democracy, staunch transatlanticists, far-right extremists, and ultra-traditional Catholics.31 The past few years, alarmingly, have witnessed an undermining of democracy spurred by a rising exploitation of divisive issues

and the active promotion of disinformation and conspiracy theories. Though views towards Russia and China vary, the transatlantic orientation of the country has received unequivocal support in Slovakia's political space in



EU membership vs. EU dictate

The country's membership in the EU stays one of the few uncontested areas in the political discourse. Even the far-right Kotleba-LSNS party, which had previously unsuccessfully (due to a lack of signatures) attempted to initiate a referendum on "Slovexit", has shifted its rhetoric and stopped advocating for leaving the bloc.22 The rhetoric of key political parties on the EU, however, extends beyond

constructive criticism calling for reforms. Numerous benefits go unquestioned, including the Euro currency seen as a source of stability and the Schengen area perceived as a symbol of freedom. Many political actors have, however, framed the Union as an "other" and targeted "Brussels" as a key component in their blame-game. The most prevalent political narrative in the past six years consisted of the so-called

Being in the core [of the EU] will probably mean the loss of further freedoms... maybe, as Slovakia, we will not be able to have our own taxes. That will be unified, dictated to us. Maybe it means having to accept as many migrants as Brussels dictates to you, with no objections!33

Boris Kollár, leader of Sme Rodina, 2017

There is nothing better than the EU, we are the EU and there is no functioning alternative.34

Robert Fico. leader of SMER-SD and then Prime Minister, 2018

"Brussels dictate" that treats the EU institutions as dominant forces giving orders to Slovakia and oppressing national sovereignty.35

Although the financial and migration crises tended to catalyze emotionally charged rhetoric laying blame at the EU, for some, these postures shifted depending on their political status. Both Robert Fico (SMER-SD) and Igor Matovič (OĽANO). for example, took less critical and more constructive stances towards the EU when holding the post of Prime Minister than when they were the party leaders.

The Russian presence has been unmistakable throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The Serbian donation of Sputnik V vaccines to North Macedonia,43 for example, was mediated by Ivan Stoilkovic, MP and leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in North Macedonia, who, on multiple occasions, has openly displayed an affinity towards Russia44. The

government's decision to not

procure the Sputnik V vaccine

while no other vaccines were

available was condemned by

almost all opposition party

leaders, 48

Nonetheless, between 2016 and 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expelled Russian diplomats on three occasions. The first expulsion in 2018 came as an act of solidarity with the United Kingdom over the Skripal case*6. Two more in 2021, meanwhile, were accompanied with no official explanation apart from it being a matter of national security.47 Some politicians showed neutrality48 towards these decisions, though others criticized them openly49.

While Macedonian politicians display a cautious approach in commenting on Russia and its actions, most politicians from Albanian parties (except government officials⁵⁰) espouse negative attitudes.51

O Russia showed Christian love and intelligence and did not respond to the Macedonian decision, but did it in a very principled and cultural way [...] this is a 'deja vu' moment where Macedonia is trying, on one hand, to flatter the West and the EU and to prove itself as the most loyal ally and, on the other hand, to demonstrate power in front of the domestic public.52

Ivan Stojiljkovic, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs, 2021



O North Macedonia expelled three Russian diplomats on different occasions since 2018.

Concerning openness to Beijing

More than 80% of surveyed esperts agreed that China's influence in North Macedonia is minor to non-existent. The Chinase Embassy, however, makes its sizable presence in the country apparent through regular meetings with significant rolltics figures, garnering positive poyerage in both traditional and social media.43 Two of the biggest Macedonian political parties have expressed their appreciation rowards China for promoting a constructive relationship and beneficial cooperation on the economy, healthcare, culture, investment, and infrastructure⁵⁴.

The Self and Road Initiative (BRI)65, through multiple memoranda



of understanding with China, is being used as a soft power instrument, influencing crucial political decisions. The availability of below-market loans to finance new infrastructure also raises concerns about the emerging revels of debt dependency on Chinese providers of the country.⁵⁶ Gooperation with China was, nevertheless, more than welcomed by the previous VMRO-DPMNE government.

Successful realization of the projects so far is the best guarantee and motivation for continuing cooperation (with China). In this context, success stories should not only continue, they should be promoted in every possible way, 57

Nikola Poposki, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2017

Current Prime Minister Zaev has on many occasions expressed the readiness of his government to implement bilateral infrastructure projects with China which are of great interest to North Macedoniasa and indicated appreciation for China's willingness to approve loans to the country for building critical infrastructure.



e administration

Politicians from the smaller Albanjan parties, meanwhile, seem to hold either neutral or predominantly negative⁶⁰ attitudes towards China but are not as vocal about it as they are towards Russian influence, Even though DUI, the biggest Albanian Party, has voiced concern about the rise of China in their latest manifesto⁴⁴ and reiterated its orientation towards the West, some politicians have given indications that they are open-minded towards Beijing, particularly with respect to donations and investments that concern the Albanian population.

The generally positive sentiment towards China has increased during the pandemic against a backdrop that has seen China offer significant medical support to North Macedonia⁶⁵ to acclaim from politicians of all stripes. An overt pro-Beijing orientation, in fact, was displayed by Prime Minister Zaev during his visit to a vaccination center, together with the Minister of Health and the Chinese Ambassador⁶⁴. The event witnessed the prime minister openly declare his preference for the Sinovac vaccine.



The COVID-19 pandemic and its ramifications continue to reverberate across Central and Eastern Europe, influencing public attitudes on geopolitical topics, world leaders (such as perceptions of friends and foes) and support for democracy.

Our research shows that societies value stability and credible sources during crises. As vaccination campaigns ramp up and Central and Eastern European societies gradually return to pre-COVID-19 routines, this report takes stock of the pandemic and its implications on public trust and attitudes on pressing issues. Key highlights from the survey include:

Germany - a beacon of stability in a time of distress

Against the backdrop of pandemic-fuelled uncertainty. Germany has emerged as the most important strategic partner in the region according to 57% of respondents. Berlin is followed at a distance by Washington (35%) and Moscow (23%). Apart from Poland and Romania, where the US was more preferred, Germany was the most commonly selected strategic partner in every surveyed country.

EU and **NATO** remain overwhelmingly popular across the **CEE** region

Support for EU membership, favoured by 78% of respondents on average across the region, remains resolute. Attitudes towards NATO membership are also largely positive, with 73% of respondents, on average, affirming their backing.

China's human rights violations are on the radar in CEE

More than 50% of respondents in every surveyed country, apart from Bulgaria, believe that human rights are being systematically violated in China.

Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy efforts fall to garner public support

Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy has been met with only limited success, with merely 5% of people in the region expressing a preference for the Sputnik V vaccine over alternatives and less than 1% for Chinese vaccines like Sinovac.

While the willingness of people to get vaccinated has increased, some COVID-19 conspiracy theories still

persist

Acceptance of the narrative asserting that public authorities are overestimating the number of COVID-19 cases amounts to at least 20% of the population in every surveyed country.

8

National governments perceived as incompetent in handling the pandemic.

In 8 out of 10 countries, a majority of respondents judge their governments to have handled the pandemic badly. Since October 2020, the number of respondents with this critical view has soared in 5 countries.

6

Anti-pandemic measures are seen as a threat to fundamental rights and freedoms

In 7 of 10 countries, a majority of respondents believe that COVID-19 measures will result in a long-term detrimental impact to their rights and freedoms.

9

Democracy does not equate to liberal democracy

The identification of democracy as an Ideal governance system has plummeted by 15 percentage points and seen its buy-in fade in 9 of 10 surveyed countries when the word "liberal" is added before democracy. This reflects a significant backlash against liberalism as a term in many parts of the region.

Trust in medical and scientific authorities underpins vaccine interest

Whereas only 53% of CEE respondents, on average. are interested in getting the COVID-19 Jab, this figure grows to 63% among those who trust leading medical experts and scientists.

10

Support for more stringent social media regulations gains momentum in CEE

More than 50% of respondents in 7 out of 10 countries agree that social media should be more strictly regulated, yet considerable differences between countries are present.





COVID-19 vaccination potential highest in Austria Vaccine interest potential,

WEST

among surveyed countries, is greatest in Austria (81%). with the vast majority either already received the jab or planning to get vaccinated This willingness to get

vaccinated can be attributed, in part, to the relatively robust trust that Austrians express towards medical authorities and pharmaceutical companies.

Of all surveyed countries, US President Joe Biden is the most popular in Austria, with 76% perceiving him positively.

Austria also has a strong awareness of human rights violations in China, with 90% of respondents believing that human rights are being systematically violated there.

The regulation of digital platforms is gaining traction in Austria, with nearly three quarters of the population backing more stringent regulations on social media companies like Facebook Instagram and YouTube.

Estonia









Estonia indicates greatest level of trust in mainstream media

Estonia enjoys the distinction of being the only surveyed country classified as home to a good media environment, according to the World Press Freedom Index, The GLOBSEC Trends survey confirmed this finding. with Estonia being one of only two countries in the region experiencing an increase in media trust (now at 62%) in

Alongside Poland and Lithuania, respondents in Estonia affiliate themselves, geopolitically, most closely to the West (44% believe Estonia should be part of the

49% of respondents in Estonia perceive the US as the most important strategic partner for the country, with 52% rating US President Joe Biden favourably.

Estonians are the second least likely, following Austria, to fall victim to conspiracy theories concerning COVID-19, with only 16% in Estonia, on average, accepting these narratives!

BALTICS

Latvia supportive of the EU but unfamiliar with Ursula von der Leyen

Respondents in Latvia are among the most ardent proponents of EU membership, with 84% expressing their support for remaining in the bloc.

Yet 41% of respondents in the country are unable to express an opinion regarding Ursula von der Leyen.

There is also a rather low level of awareness concerning China in Latvia - 23% are undecided on whether the Chinese regime could be an inspiration for their country.

Respondents in Latvia are most inclined, among Baltic countries, to believe conspiracy theories concerning COVID-19.

A majority in Latvia, in addition to Bulgaria and Romania, believe that having a strong and decisive leader who need not bother with parliament or elections is good for their country.

BALTICS

Lithuania exhibits most pronounced pro-Western leanings in region

Despite robust support for EU membership, only 31% of Lithuanians, the least in the region, believe the EU should be responsible for negotiating COVID-19 vaccine purchases.

Lithuania is the most strident proponent of a Western geopolitical orientation in the region, with 47% preferring to position their country in the West.


European leaders are popular in Lithuania - Angela Merkel is viewed positively by 72% of respondents, Emmanuel Macron by 61% and Ursula von der Leyen by 52%.

Lithuanians, however, are relatively sceptical of democracy. with only 70% agreeing that democracy is a good system for their country, the lowest in the region.

ctrategic power of the con



The Centr European the West" is not so in according Trends pol West, with and living s seen as eco Central and societies ar towards ma own identiti the region (i underscores are embraci labelled as a approach, w be understoo to define one overcome so complexes co power domin resonate for



Joe Biden more popular the US

> states tend to be viewed the prism of their leaders, titudes of the top political each of the three ower* countries are, notably, y different than views towards a partnership more generally pect to each country.

ourability ratings of all three surpass the percentage ing their respective es as strategic partners. This lancy, as it pertains to President and the US, is most striking in (46%), Czechia (38%), Hungary and Slovakia (39%), with Joe viewed in a considerably more e light than the country he sents.

ase of Vladimir Putin is also telling. He is viewed, not bectedly, most favourably in ria and Slovakia. The placement ngary and Romania, respectively, of and fourth, however, is ble. This finding contrasts with obust support for NATO and/or Western orientation in the two tries.




While anti-Russian sentiments are widely documented and prevalent throughout Romania, there are voices that directly or indirectly praise the country and specifically its leadership. Putin is perhaps perceived as a man of action. a true patriot, and a great leader by a sizeable share of the public. These are all qualities that make a true statesman, according to public opinion. Let us not forget that strategies aimed at bolstering its image and soft power in the

Funky Citizens, Romania

Have you previously heard about the following leaders and if yes, do you perceive them positively or negatively?

Share of those who view a particular world leader positively.





Vladimir Putin, president of Russia

Viadimir Putin's image remained largely stable over the past four years in CEE. Slovakia is an exception to this trend, since the public approval of Kremlin leader has increased by 14%.





The invisible Chinese leader

Despite the Increasing economic and political power of China, its leader, Xi Jinping, does not enjoy similar favourability ratings in the survey group as his two peers. Xi Jinping is less popular and less well-known. Unlike Biden and Putin, one in four CEE respondent, in fact, never heard of Xi Jinping. In some countries, the share of those unaware of the leader of the world's most populous country reached 30% or more (Slovakia 39%, Bulgaria 38% and Poland 34%).



One in four CEE respondents never heard of Xi Jinping.

Such perception of Chinese leader affests to the fact that China's presence in the surveyed countries is either viewed with suspicion or largely ignored. Further details on findings pertaining to China are included in the next chapter.

Joe Biden is perceived fabourably, on average, by 53% of respondents in surveyed countries.

Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, trails these figures by nearly 20 points, putting his positive sentiment at 35%.

Xi Jingping, for his part, ranks third in the superpower grouping at 16%.

Angela Merkel

Austria 71%

Estonia 70% Letvia 68%

Romentia 62%

Bulgaria 60%

Hungary 50%

Czechia 53%

Merkel's spike in popularity

Historical data indicates

that the popularity of the leaders is not static and rather

sensitive to international

developments. In GLOBSEC

far worse in Bulgaria, Hungary,

Trends polling in 2017, the Image of Angela Merkel was

Czechia and Slovakia than

today. Nearly three times as

many respondents indeed

now perceive Angela Merkel

more positively than in 2017

in Slovakia and Czechia, One

crisis, which was still present

on the political agenda in 2017.

the fact that the migration

saw Germany stake out a contrasting position to that of

the V4 countries.

plausible explanation concerns

Those who found Angela Merkel "likeable" in 2017

Romania 67%

Bulgaria 39% Poland 59%

Slovakia 19%

Czechia 21%

Hungary 38%

preferred partner in Hungary, with the economic importance of Hungarian-German bilateral relations widely recognised. Audi and Mercedes are among the country's largest employers, a fact frequently mentioned in the Hungarian media. The not too favourable views of Chancellor Merkel and President Macron are probably the result of aggressive targeting of each by pro-government media at different points. Merkel was primarily attacked for her role in the migration crisis, whereas Macron was identified as a key opponent of Prime Minister Orbán on the EU scene following his election victory."

"Germany has long been a

No opinion

Up to 25% of respondents in some countries expressed no opinion towards Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson. The highest level of indecisiveness was recorded in Latvia and Lithuania (approximately 1 in 4 declined to express an opinion or did not know what to think of on Macron. and Johnson), with sizeable pockets of people uncertain in Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary (approximately 1 in 5). These survey findings could indicate limited societal awareness of political developments in other European

Emmanuel

Macron

Slovakla 68%

Lithuania 61%

Austria 61%

Czechia 60%

Estonia 57%

Latvia 57%

Romania 50%

Bulgaria 49%

Poland 39%

Hungary 38%

Have you previously

Share of those who view a particular world leader positively

heard about the following

leaders and if yes, do you perceive them positively or negatively?

This finding indicates that the and their leaders are, to some extent, Interlinked, though causality cannot be definitively established.

Emmanuel Macron's favourability, notably, correlates with those identifying France as a strategic partner – i.e. in those countries where Macron is viewed most positively, France is also selected as a strategic

Boris

Poland 49%

Hungary 49%

Czechia 48%

Estonia 47%

Siovakia 45%

Romania 43%

Latvia 41%

Lithuania 40%

Bulgaria 38%

Austria 27%

Johnson

partner by the highest percentage of

35

37

There is a close relationship between identification of the three European

countries as strategic partners and the popularity of their three leaders. While Chancellor Merkel is perceived most positively in the region, with 62% of

respondents giving her a favourable

rating, Emmanuel Macron enjoys an above water image among 54% of

people surveyed in CEE and Boris

Johnson 43%.

Political Capital, Hungary

Aj vďaka nášmu vizuálnemu spracovaniu sa dáta Globsecu každoročne dostávajú k stovkám dôležitých stakeholderov, ale aj miliónom bežných ľudí, ktorí vďaka nim lepšie chápu stav dnešného sveta.

GLOBSEC Trends 2021 a Vulnerability Index 2021

Najnovšie reporty Globsecu sa objavili vo viac ako 170 výstupoch renomovaných zahraničných aj domácich médií.

GLOBSEC Trends 2021 a Vulnerability Index 2021

POLITICO




euobserver


euronews.




BalkanInsight









>aktuality.sk


















EU Influence: Who's most vulnerable to foreign influence? — MEP takes over Hungarian opposition party — Tobacco lobbying gets scrutiny



⊖Uronews. Europe World Business Sport Green More ▼ **≡** Programmes ▼







01:45 / 02:22






15. nov 2021 o 14:08

Sympatie voči Rusku a prijímanie falošných správ patria k slabinám Slovákov

Vyplýva to zo štúdie organizácie GLOBSEC o odolnosti a zraniteľnosti krajín voči zahraničnému vplyvu.


Tlačová agentúra



PLUS Ako Rusko a Čína ovplyvňujú Európu: najhoršie je Srbsko, Slovensko skončilo za Českom

Svet | 15.11.2021 16:00

Ako Rusko a Čína ovplyvňujú Európu: najhoršie je Srbsko, Slovensko skončilo za Českom





Ľudia v rôznych krajinách sa líšia v postoji k vakcínam. Prečo?

3.6.2021 14:02 O Spoločnosť Koronavírus



Zdroj foto: TASR/František Iván

Ochota ľudí dať sa zaočkovať je vyššia v krajinách, kde s konšpiračným naratívom, že



Podpora NATO na Slovensku rastie aj napriek hoaxom a konšpiráciám

Slovensko patrí medzi zraniteľnejšie krajiny, ktoré napádajú dezinformátori.

Tomáš Rybár, Juraj Rizman Redakcia, Externý prispievateľ





PROMINENTI ŠPORT ZOH PEKING 2022 TIP OD VÁS NORA KUCHERENKO

Biden alebo Putin? Slováci vyjadrili, ktorého prezidenta majú radšej








Dnes jsem se setkal s předsedou vlády Slovenské republiky Eduardem Hegerem. Společně jsme probírali i se zástupci evropského byznysu postcovidovou nápravu země i zasažených regionů a pocovidový plán obnovy, který slovenská vláda předkládá občanům i Evropské komisi.


Translate Tweet





EUvsDisinfo 🕗 @EUvsDisinfo · Jun 6, 2021


Despite tons of #disinformation, pro-Kremlin outlets have failed to convince people in Central and Eastern Europe about Navalny's prison sentence, as shown by a new report of @GLOBSEC. See for more trends: globsec.org/wp-content/upl...



















Home Channels Webstreaming Browse By ▼

Home > WebStreaming > Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation







Vzniká to spoločne

Ako väčšina vecí u nás aj reporty pre Globsec vznikajú v úzkej spolupráci s klientom. Po načítaní prvého draftu reportu spravíme spoločný workshop, na ktorom si rozvrhneme štruktúru a zobrazenie kľúčových častí. Dohodneme si základné vizuálne rámce a hlavný odkaz celej publikácke.

Since October 2020, worrying signs of the COVID-19 second wave began manifesting across Europe, with rapid spikes in the number of reported cases¹².

By March 2021, CEE countries, which had been commended during the first wave for their quick imposition of strict lockdown measures (and few COVID-19 related fatalities), were among those most affected¹³.

Slovakia, for example, garnered negative international press coverage, recording the highest COVID-19 related death rate per million citizens in the world¹⁴. Similarly, Hungary, Czechia, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania found themselves among the top 25 countries with the highest death rate per million citizens¹⁵.

There are several factors at play that contributed to this debacle including an extensive easing of safety precautions during the summer, inadequate preparation for the second wave and hesitant attitudes towards the reimposing of lockdowns in autumn and winter¹⁶ along with poor quality of health care systems. As CEE countries reel from the devastating impact of the second wave on families, livelihoods and the economy, the implementation of an efficient vaccination strategy presents a viable path forward.

Tvorba vizuálneho konceptu

Keďže pracujeme s dátami, ich správna vizuálna reprezentácia je najdôležitejšia. Tvorba konceptu nie je iba o farbách či písme, ale o tom, ktoré informácie sú najdôležitejšie a ako s nimi pracovať v prospech danej témy. Vďaka tomu sú všetky kľúčové zistenia jasné na prvý pohľad a čitateľ si ich ľahko zapamätá. Týmto spôsobom do detailu ladime grafy, strany a celé kapitoly.



one (Estonia) of to see the CEE countries as meeting the bar for a good media environment. The media climate environment. The media climate was, nonetheless, evaluated as satisfactory in Austria, Latvia, satisfactory in Austria, Czechia and Lithuania, Slovakia, Czechia and Romania³⁰. Three countries Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria were judged to have a problematic media environment according to the index.

The media in surveyed CEE countries, in addition to the countries, in addition to the challenges noted above, must also cope with pervasive distrust of their institution by vast majorities of the population.



Distrust on the rise

in sever of the streamed countries, historical of the distributions, model included by an average of a demonstrate countries, countr




In diagram, the expanse in made pass coming stabilities to a sign to foreign exhaustic of majora-ammonations in (\$10) Now Medic Group, +o... Abicogo nottkay of torios a lang-roim ar-cidida in-rage in chirt, day read disc. the explained by the daing policient accent production; modarko Akcinatysia (the Calculate American Inc. and the storiger media meter posture of pro-Western outless with the airc Sichonedia Orace


Contact for the Story of Consciously, Hugania Excluding
Estonia,
58% of
respondents
in the
countries
lack trust in
mainstream
media, a
concerning
increase from
51% in March
2020.

Publikáciou to nekončí


Hladame nielen idealnu formu samotného reportu, ale aj pridružených obsahov: social media postov, explainer videí, interaktívnych máp a ďalších nosičov, ktoré nám pomáhajú čo najzrozumiteľnejšie komunikovať zistenia Globsecu.

Social media posty





59% in CEE believe Alexei Navalny should not have been sent to jail by Russian authorities after



In 8 out of 10 countries, a majority of respondents judge their governments to have handled the pandemic badly.



More

the p

of st


part


GLC

Trei

Trei

Social media posty











political entities and representatives expressed mostly positive attitudes towards Russia.







Political representative North Macedonia pro-Western in the re 8/100 in their attitude the EU and NATO.

Explainer videá

© Every wondered about countries' vulnerability to Russian and Chinese influence?


© www.vulnerabilityindex.org











How vulnerable is ** North Macechaia to foreign malign influence?



is exploited by pro-Krei


including the Serbian O

frequently spread anti-N

Vulnerability Index 2021 je aj online

Klasický papierový report rozšíril interaktívny web vulnerabilityindex.org





examines the vulnerabilities of eight

Balkan countries towards foreign


Central European and Western

Russian and to some extent

Chinese - influence in 5 dimensions: public attitudes,

LOBSEC

nerability





OFocus on Romania



COVID-19 scepticism widespread across Romania

Introduction () Reading time 4 min

Pellentesque ac finibus tellus. Integer vehicula augue posuere ipsum maximus, at accumsan sapien gravida. Sed placerat est quis porta convallis. Nunc placerat leo vel mi commodo venenatis. Integer iaculis vehicula ligula eget pulvinar. Praesent rutrum quis massa a ullamcorper. Nam bibendum dignissim tellus, nec molestie nulla feugiat quis.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aliquam egestas vestibulum ipsum. Donec non justo rutrum, auctor dui nec, tempus ipsum Maecenas ut ante magna. Etiam pulvinar purus sem, sit amet varius nisl semper sit amet. Sed nec dui pulvinar, porta nibh eu, varius eros. Curabitur gravida metus quis turpis imperdiet dapibus ut et libero. Fusce vel tincidunt eros. Donec in sollicitudin risus, et maximus sapien. Mauris gravida, lacus ac blandit facilisis, arcu est faucibus tellus, a malesuada nunc risus aliquet orci, Suspendisse posuere ullamcorper ipsum non varius. Ut rutrum accumsan ante, in tempor diam laoreet ac. Praesent sed ⊙ augue elit. Nullam id sapien elit. Praesent auctor suscipit purus.

Pellentesque ac finibus tellus

Morbi nisl odio, tincidunt nec semper id, euismod nec purus. Sed ornare auctor vulputate. Ut interdum laoreet nibh, ut imperdiet risus consectetur a. Integer condimentum ultricies arcu vel tristique. Pellentesque consectetur massa et lacus pulvinar, ac volutpat lectus rhoncus. Aliquam convallis arcu

Public attitudes

Chapter 1 (3) Reading time 4 min

Go to chapter Intro 2 3 4 5

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Proin auctor blandit augue id faucibus. Nullam et bibendum lorem, eu euismod libero.

focused on **Public attitudes**

78

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Proin auctor blandit augue id faucibus. Nullam et bibendum lorem, eu euismod libero. Integer eu porttitor augue. Nullam non pharetra orci. Duis eget ex lectus. Donec elit ligula, volutpat non vestibulum vel, elementum a nibh. Integer sit amet porta sapien.³ Maecenas id consectetur ligula, euismod ultricies neque. Fusce a posuere erat, eu scelerisque felis. Suspendisse feugiat sapien quis arcu aliquet maximus. Vivamus ipsum massa, porta non libero et, hendrerit posuere dolor. Pellentesque a nibh lacinia, cursus nisi non, dapibus lectus.





G Back to


Index map

Vulnerability

Focus on other country **Bulgaria** Czechia Hungary **Montenegro** North Macedonia Romania Slovakia Serbia



f 💆 in ...




stakeholders.



Like The Index? Share it with friends f 🔰 in …







Civic and academic space

Pellentesque volutpat sodales mauris, vel ultricies metus. Integer bibendum consectetur laoreet. Vestibulum ante ipsum primis in faucibus orci⁷ luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia curae.

↓ Vulnerability score

ownload The Index in full

Bulgaria

Czechia

ctiv

ıln€

ıroı

oun nd t

ublic

Hungary

Montenegro

Romania

flue 🖲 Serbia

ndscape, public

cademic space.

• The Index

combining:

per country

in each country

🗱 North Macedonia

dministration, information

ndscape and civic and

is a result of multi-

Expert surveys with at least 20 experts

Expert interviews conducted by analysts

Country focus

Downloads

ne Index is coupled with

series of White Papers

oviding specific policy

omestic and international

commendations to

akeholders.


method research

an,

IS:

iese,







Seesame x GLOBSEC Policy Institute 💙

"Naše výskumy sú často zložité a vychádzajú z veľmi rôznorodých dát a analýz. Spolu so Seesame sa nám však darí pretaviť ich do formy, ktorá je na prvý pohľad zrozumiteľná pre analytikov, novinárov aj bežných ľudí. Navyše sa Seesame podarilo vytvoriť z našich GLOBSEC Trends značku, ktorá každým rokom zaujme novotou, ale zároveň ostáva rozpoznateľná pre partnerov, ktorí našu prácu sledujú.



Dominika Hajduriaditeľka Centra pre demokraciu a odolnosť,
GLOBSEC

Seesame x GLOBSEC Policy Institute 💙

To je pre think tank zo strednej Európy, ktorý musí bojovať s veľkými organizáciami z Bruselu či Washingtonu, obrovskou devízou. Spolupráca so Seesame nás každoročne posúva vpred, núti nás rozmýšľať nielen o obsahu, ale aj o forme, a pomáha našej analytickej práci vo svete think tankov vyniknúť."



Dominika Hajdu riaditeľka Centra pre demokraciu a odolnosť, GLOBSEC

Prezentácie a briefingy GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021

Závery výskumu GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021 boli prezentované na nasledujúcich eventoch:

- o Tlačový brífing pre cca 10 slovenských, českých a maďarských novinárov
- o 5 separátnych tlačových brífingov v partnerských krajinách (Rumunsko, Bulharsko, Srbsko, Čierna Hora, Severné Macedónsko)
- o Asi 15 briefingov a 10 prezentácií

V Bratislave

- o Pre predstaviteľov štátnej správy SR
- o Pre členov zahraničných misií a občianskej spoločnosti na SR organizovaná v spolupráci s ambasádou Francúzska v Bratislave
- o Pre predstaviteľov ambasády Kanady

V Bruseli

- o Cca 10 predstaviteľov NATO
- o 12 predstaviteľov Európskej komisie
- o 5 poslancov Európskeho parlamentu
- o Misia Spojených štátov pri Európskej únií

Prezentácie a briefingy GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index 2021

Vo Washingtone DC

- o Cca 20 zamestnancov Ministerstva zahraničných vecí Spojených štátov
- o Asi 15 predstaviteľov amerických think-tankov a mimovládnych organizácií
- o Workshop s predstaviteľmi Taiwanu

V Štokholme

- o Špeciálna prezentácia GLOBSEC Vulnerability Indexu na workshope Európske centrum excelentnosti pre boj proti hybridným hrozbám
- o Asi 50 expertov na hybridné hrozby a podvratné aktivity realizované Ruskom a Čínov z EÚ krajín

Online

- o pre asi 10 predstaviteľov USAID (americkej agentúry)
- o Prezentácia na asi 10 konferenciách /webinároch v Srbsku, v USA a na Slovensku
- o "Hearing" v INGE komisii Európskeho parlamentu

Prezentácie a briefingy GLOBSEC Trends 2021

GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum 2021: prezentácia výsledkov pred publikom cca 200 účastníkov z celého sveta; súkromná prezentácia pre 4 novinárov z New York Times, Foreign Policy, a pod.; debata za okrúhlym stolom s 20 expertami, vrátane bývalej prezidentky Chorvátska, riaditeľky plánovania NATO, a pod.

Spolu asi 20 briefingov a prezentácií, okrem iného pre:

- o pre ambasády: Belgicka, Fínska, USA, UK, Španielska
- o pre slovenskú a českú štátnu správu
- o pre Európsku komisiu a Európsky parlament
- o pre ministerstvo zahraničných vecí Ukrajiny

Dáta citované:

- o Igorom Matovičom počas rozhovoru s Braňom Závodským
- o Nemeckým prezidentom počas verejnej debaty s GLOBSECom v septembri 2021

Tu nájdete <u>Trends</u> a Vulnerabiliy Index. Nevadí, ak bežne nečítate reporty.



